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Combining  elements  from the theories  of public  Interpreting  indirect  evidence,  he shows that the
choice and benefit  taxation,  Catsambas  develops  privaZa  sector  would  prefer less government
a framework  in which  private cidzens  can  acdvity in all countries,  from a low of 5 percent
evaluate  public activities.  less public spending  (in Poland)  to a high of one-
third  less (in Slovenia).  If those governments
Why, and under what circumstances,  do  were to follow  those guidelines,  their spending-
"bureaucrats"  increase  the size  of the public  to-GDP  ratios  would  more closely  resemble  the
sector and the amount  of public spending  in their  1987-89  average  for a selected  group of
own self interest?  European  market economies.
What does the private sector  think  public  Catsambas  also introduces  a more rigorous,
output  should  be, what is actual  public  output,  if not necessarily  more  objective,  approach  to
and how does the private sector  evaluate  that  determining  "optimal"  government  spending.
output?  This approach  requires  little information,  but
uses i static model  and requires  faith in the
Catsamrbas  applies  the theoretical  results  of  direcdon  of causality  for some key variables.  To
an attempt  to answer  these questions  in four  the extent that one can accept  those limitations,
Central  European  countries  (Czechoslowakia,  the model may  be a useful operational  tool in
Hungary,  Poland, and Slovenia),  using  actual  public spending  evaluation.
data for 1989-91  and projections  for 1992.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The question  of the optimal level of public expenditures  has long concerned  students of public
finance. In his classical  analysis  of the efficient  level of public expenditures,  Samuelson  [1954]
introduced  a reference  private good and developed  the well-known  condition  that an optimal level of
expenditure  requires that the sum of the marginal  rates of substitution  between  the public good and
the private good must equal the marginal rate of transformation  between  the two goods. Samuelson's
theoretical  result assumes  that all of the revenue needed  to finance  public expenditures  can be raised
with lump-sum  taxes.  Since this is not generally  possible, the result must be modified to account  for
the distortionary  effects of an actual tax system.  Ballard  and Fullerton [1992] call this modification
the "marginal  cost of public funds" (MCF), and provide an interesting  explanation  of how several
earlier attempts  to address this problem can be seen under the unifying  prism of this concept. They
argue that many important  contributions,  including  the early Harberger [19641  approach  to the excess
burden of taxation, and the subsequent  contributions  by Stiglitz and Dasgupta [1971] and by Atkinson
and Stern [1974], can all be interpreted  along the lines of the MCF approach.  Wilson [1991]
persuasively  argues that the optimal  level of public good provision must take into account not only
efficiency  but also distributional  considerations.
Along these lines, the relationship  between taxes and expenditures,  and its implication  fbr the
optimal  provision of public output, can be seen from yet another angle, through the postulates  of the
"benefit  principle of taxation". According  to this approach,  an equivalence  is drawn between  the
market mechanism  and the provision of public expenditures  through the budget. If tax payments  are
regarded as a "price" for the provision of public expenditures  by Government,  then taxes are related
to expenditures  through Samuelson's  condition  of efficiency,  namely  that the sum of unit tax shares
must equal the stum  of the marginal  rates of substitution,  which is equal to the marginal  cost of the
public good.  This is all that is required for efficiency. If, by chance, the individual  tax price (or unit
tax share) is moreover  equal to the individual  marginal  rate of substitution,  the situation is called  a
"Lindahl  solution", after Erik Lindahl 119581,  who first described the analogy  to market equilibrium
of public expenditure  determination  in connection  with the distribution  of tax burden among various
groups. 2
I/  The author is grateful  to Martha  de Melo for hcr insightful  comments,  but remains  responsible  for the
analysis and conclusions  of this draft.
2!  Perhaps  a more appropriate  term would be thc "Lindahl-Johansen"  solution,  since it was the latter  who
popularized Lindahl's  approach  through  an excellent  exposition.  See L. Johansen  11965].This approach is related to the benefit principle  of taxation because  the taxes paid by
individuals  may be interpreted as a "price" for the provision  of public expenditures. The optimal
amount  of public output is then determined  by the condition  that the tax price must equal the marginal
rate of substitution  between  the public good and the reference  private good.  This is a powerful result,
which has implications  not only for the efficient  provision  of public expenditures,  but also for their
distributional  implications. In a seminal article along  tiese lines, Aaron and McGuire [19701  analyze
the evaluation  of public output by individuals  and conclude  that the beneficiaries  of government
programs may have diverse  perspectives  in their appreciation  of public expenditures  depending  on
their perceived  "tax price".  In particular, Aaron-McGuire  show that if the unit tax share is less
(more)  than the marginal  rate of substitution  for an individual,  the individual  evaluates  the public
good higher (lower) than the tax it actually  pays to the Government. Therefore, if the actual  tax
shares are observed, we may determine  whether  the provision  of public output is higher or lower than
the optimal amount  desired by individuals. This condition, in turn, determines  whether the provision
of public services has a positive or negative  redistributive  impact  on those individuals.
II.  PURPOSE  AND CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK  OF THE PAPER
This paper attempts  to shed light on the issue of optimal  government  spending by modifying
and extending the Lindahl-Aaron-McGuire  approach  to benefit taxation. Its spirit is similar 'Lo  several
recent contributions  in this area, which emphasize  the public choice approach  to many old questions
in public finance. 3 In doing so, the analysis  introduces  elements  from the theory of bureaus, and
attempts  to combine the two approaches  into a unified  theory of optimal  government  spending. The
theory  of bureaus (Niskanen [19711,[1975]),  recognizes  that demand for government  activities  is
expressed  through the political system, in which "bureaucrats"  may play an independent  and at the
same  time powerful role. The basic tenet of this theory is that divergent interests among  different
groups of society, and, notably, between citizens  and bureaucrats, may lead to a discrepancy  between
the amount  of public services demanded  by citizens  and that provided  by Government. 4 In other
words, the new theory of public finance recognizes  that the outcome  of government  activities depends
on both the demand and the supply of goods and services  to be provided  by the public sector.  In
recent years particular attention  has been paid to the institutions  of upply, i.e. the government
bureaucracy,  and on how their decisions  may influence  the total amount of public services.
This perspective  is particularly  relevant for countries  that are emerging from a long system of
command  economy, such as the countries  of Central and Eastern Europe.  The role of Government
under the previous regimes was overwhelming,  and it is not clear to what extent the provision of
public services was in response  to genuine private demand, or was simply the conscious manipulation
of government  by bureaucrats  to their own benefit. As those countries  began to take the road towards
2/  For a verv interesting and readable coverage of various fiscal topics  from this standpoint,  see Cullis and
Jones 119921.
4/  Some economists distinguish yet another line of reasoning, the so-called "Leviathan" model,  which asserts that the
degree of government  monopoly on tax revenues depends upon the degree of fiscal decentralization.  Oates
[1985,19891 provides an empirical analysis of this theory, but his results are inconclusive.  I personally believe that
this model is a simple extension of Niskanen's  ideas, and it can be conceptually subsumed under his theory of
bureaus.
-2-the market economy, their Governments  also took the decision in principle to limit the role of the
public sector over the medium  term.  At the same time, the inertia of the system may be expected  to
cause a continuation  of a large amount  of public services in the foreseeable  future.  Given, however,
the explicit  decision of political authorities  in those countries  to limit the scope of the public sector,
the question is,"  by how much ?"
The fundamental  hypothesis  of this paper is that this question  may be answered by the
difference, if any, between the private sector's own evaluation  of benefits from the provision  of
public goods and services, expressed  in pecuniary terms, and their budgetary  costs.  In many cases
the beneficiaries  of government  programs would be utterly surprised to find out the cost of a public
service compared with their own evaluation  of the benefits  obtained  from that service. If one can
measure this discrepancy, one can in principle obtain a quantitative  guideline  for a possible
retrenchment  of tht public sector. It should be emphasized  at this point that conceptually  there is no
a priori reason why the evaluation  of public services  by individuals  must necessarily  be lower than
the actual cost of provision, which is interpreted  as the observed benefits. As it is shown later,
however, both the evaluation  and the desired public output  by individuals  is generally lower than the
actually supplied  output by Government,  under rather weak behavioral  and stability  assumptions.
By combining  elements  from the theory of public choice and the theory of benefit taxation,
this paper attempts  to provide a conceptual  framework  for a possible quantification  of citizens'
preferences  between  privately available  and publicly  provided  goods and services. Assuming  that the
Government  is responsive  to the welfare of its citizens,  the ex ante position  of this paper is that
optimal  public output must be identified  with the output desired by citizens. Tht model presented in
this paper, therefore, aims at answering  the following  questions: First, is the public output demanded
by citizens  different from that provided  by bureaucrats  ?  Second, what determines  the amount of
public output provided by the bureaucrats  ?  Third, is the evaluation  of public output by individuals
different from the actually  supplied  amount of goods and services  through the budget, and, if so, by
how much  ?  Following  a theoretical  analysis  of these questions, the paper also attempts  to quantify
the discrepancy  between  the cost of public services  and the evaluation  of these services by individuals
in four Central Europe countries. In doing so, the paper hopes to offer some quantitative,  if not
necessari;y "objective",  guidelines  for a possible retrenchment  of government  activities in those
countries over the medium term.
Section III presents the behavioral  postulates  of the model. Section  IV uses historical  data
from four Central Europe countries  (Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Poland and Slovenia)  to quantify the
theoretical  results.  Section  V offers a summary  and conclusions.
III.  THE BEHAVIORAL  POSTULATES
To answer the threc questions  posed above, members of a given society are classified into two
groups: citizens  and bureaucrats. 5 In principle, public sector activities  should include all government
activities  that modify the allocation  of resources and the distribution  of income that would have
occurred solely  through private markets in the absence  of government. In practice, the quantification
5/  Cao-Garcia  [19831,  whose  methodology  on citizens  and bureaucrats  is followed  in this section, also recognizes
politicians  as a third distinct group of decision  makers. This group is ignored  in the present  analysis.
- 3 -of such activities, which would have included  the institutional  framework  in several sectors, the
judiciary, and countless  rules and regulations,  is impossible  to achieve. The analysis, therefore, is
confined only to those activities that can be meaningfully  measured, namely the national  budget.
A.  The Behavior  of the Private Sector
The citizens comprise  the set of individuals  who partk.ipate  in the political process, but who
are not employed  directly in the public sector.  The bureaucrats are the group of persons who are
government  employees  in charge of the implementation  of public sector activities. These two groups
are differentiated  by the preference  functions  of their members, which results in three possible
concepts  of public output: First, the observed amount  of public output, G, typically  measured
through the budget.  Second, the  amount  of public output, Gp,  desired by the private sector.  And
third, the evaluation, V, by citizens  of the actually  supplied  public output G, which may differ from
both the desired and the actual amount provided  by Government. The interplay  among these concepts
is the focus of the analysis  that follows.
A typical citizen consumes  private goods, i.e. goods that are available through the market
mechanism,  and goods that are provided  through the budget. The private consumption  of citizens is a
function  of their after tax income, and is given by equation 1:
Cp=k (Yp-T)  (1)
where Cp is private consumption  by citizens. Yp is private income, T is taxes and k is the
marginal and average propensity  to consume.
As perceived  by citizens,  taxes are related to the total amount of public output, G, and are
therefore defined by
T=nG  (2)
where n is a constant  fraction of public output. Since the tax equation (2) reflects the a priori
expectation  of citizens, n ￿1.
The utility of a citizen, Up, is determined  by the total amount  of private and governmental
goods that she is able to consume,  and is expressed  as
Up=Cp; GA=  rk(Yp-nG)  I a  GA=M(Yp-nG)*  GF  (3)
where k, M are constants, M=ka and other variables are as defined above.
The desired public output by the citizen, Gp, is obviously  the one that maximizes  her utility,
and is obtained from the first order condition  of maximization  of (3).  Setting  aUp/8G=O  and solving
for Gp  we obtain:
-4  -GP=  n  p  ((4)
As equation (4) clearly indicates,  the desired public output  by the private sector is inversely
proportional to its perceived  relationship,  n , between  taxes and expenditures,  as well as to the value
it attaches  to private goods. In general, the desired public output will also depend  on the
substitutability  between  private and governmental  goods, but in the formulation  of equation  (3) the
elasticity  of substitution  is 1 and is not a function of the parameters a  and  B  .
In a closed economy  with no private injections  into the income  stream the equilibrium  income
of the private sector is given by
YP=Ce+G  (5)
Equations (1), (2) and (5) yield the following  simple expression  for the equilibrium  income of
the private sector:
y-=  1  rk  G  (6)
Therefore, substituting  equation (6) into (4) we obtain the following  equilibrium
expression  for desired public output by the private sector:
n(a+P)  1-k  (4)
where z =  .i  . 1-nk n(a+P)  1-k
The value of parameter z and, in particular, whether it is equal to, less or greater than one,
determines  whether  the desired public output by the private sector is equal to, less or greater than the
amount  actually supplied  by Government.
B.  The Behavior of Bureaucrats
The basic assumption  about bureaucrats' behavior is that they derive utility not only from
pecuniary income, but also from other benefits that are tied to the bureau's activities. These could
include, for instance, social prestige, leisure time, upward mobility  etc.  These benefits  augment a
bureaucrat's pecuniary income according  to the following  relationship:
- 5-YB=Y (B-C)  e  (5)
where YB  is the bureaucrat's total income, Y is a given level of pecuniary income, B is an
unobservable  measure of the bureau's benefits  from the production  of its activities, and C are the
costs associated with th-e  production  of these activities. The parameter  e specifies  the ability of the
bureaucrat  to convert tie economic  surplus generated  by his agency into non-pecuniary  benefits for
his own corsumption.
Since the bureau's benefiis, B, are unobservable,  they must be related to the measurable
public output.  Following  Cao-Garcia  [1983], this relationship  is assumed  to take the form
B=iG-jG  2 (6)
which is, effectively,  the definite integral, from zero to the total output produced, of the
demand function  of its services  under a monopoly  (i.e. an all-or-nothing)  situation.
The total cost of producing  the bureau's output  is determined  by a quadratic  total cost
function, expressed  as
C=1G+mG 2 (7)
Equations  (8) and (9) can be rewritten as:
B-C=4G-*G 2 (28
where  = U(i-1)  and 4r  = (j  +m) .
The bureaucrat's consumption  is given by
CB=k(l-t)YB  (9)
where t is the actual, average tax rate.  Here, in contrast to the citizen's subjective  tax rate
"n", it is assumed that the typical bureaucrat  is fully aware of the cost of public services  and of their
implications  for the average tax rate.  Substituting  equations  (5) and (10) into equation (11) we then
obtain
CB=k  (1 -t)  Y ((O,G  -*lG2) e  (10)
We assume that the bureaucrat's utility function  has the same functional  form as that of the
citizen's, namely
UB=CB-  GP6
-6 -Substituting  equation  (12) into (13) and collecting  terms, we finally arrive at
Ur=NGP  (tG-  -iG 2 )e  (12)
where N= (k (1-t)Y] 
and 0=ecg.
The desired public output Ly bureaucrats, Gs, is derived from the first order condition  of
maximizing  (14).  Setting 8UB/aG=O,  we finally arrive at
G  _  +e  =  P+ea  ._0  (13)
BI,  P +20  13+2ea  4r
One may notice from equation (15) that the optimal  output according to the bureaucrat's
preferences is critically  dependent  on the values of the parameters a  and PB.  In the limit, when ,B
becomes zero, the bureaucrat can only increase  his utility by increasing  the value of B-C, i.e. by
expanding  the value of the economic  surplus generated  by the bureau's activities. In this case all the
rewards accrued to the bureaucrat  are directly associated  to the efficiency  of the bureau, i.e. to the
relative magnitudes  of *  and *.  The output that maximizes  his utility will be:
GB= 2P  (15)
At the other extreme, when ca=O,  the bureaucrat  becomes  unable to appropriate  any benefit
from an increase in efficiency,  and the optimal  output becomes
GB= 40  (15")
Equation (15") implies an output level twice the magnitude  of the previous case, and explains
why, in the absence  of efficiency  considerations,  a rational  behavior on the part of bureaucrats
generates a tendency towards a larger public sector than otherwise.
C.  The  evaluation  ofpublic  output  by citizens.
It was mentioned  earlier that the evaluation  of public output  by citizens can be different from
the conventionally  measured bundle  of goods and services  provided by government,  i.e. the budget.
In fact, the appropriate  measurement  of public activity is one of the most difficult  questions  in public
finance, since, in the absence  of a market mechanism,  public activities are typically  measured by
inputs (i.e. costs) and not by outputs. As noted earlier, one promising  approach  toward the
evaluation  of public output is based on the benefit principle  of taxation, and may be heuristically
explained  as follows. 6
6/  For a formal  analysis  of this approach  see Catsambas  [1983].
-7 -'he  benefit principle  of taxation  suggests  that the allocation  of taxes reflects the view that a
tax is set as a price designed  to correspond  to the marginal  utility derived from the provision of public
output. In other words, the benefit principle of taxation  draws an analogy  between the pricing
process of private goods in a market economy  and the allocation  of taxes according to individual
preferences.  Although  for purposes  of taxation  the ability-to-pay  prir;ciple  is regarded superior to the
benefit principle, the latter is still appealing  for the expenditure  side.  In fact, the combination  of the
two principles providss a rigorous criterion  for measuring  the redistributional  impact of the public
sector.  This argument  supports  the distinction  made earlier between  the tax rate facing a consumer
and the tax rate facing the bureaucrat: the former, denoted by "n" in equation (2) is based on the
benefit principle of taxation, whereas  the latter, denoted  by "t", is based on the ability-to-pay
principle. If citizens  are levied taxes according  to the "ability-to-pay"  principle, but evaluate  public
servir s according  to lhe "benefit  principle", a comparison  between  the two mea ---es of the tax
burden is primafacie evidence  of the redistributive  role of Government.
The evaluation  of public output by the private sector may then be cast in the following  terms:
Suppose  a citizen knows, or assumes,  the amount  of public output. How minu would she be willing
to be ,;.axed  in return for the activities of the public sector? If the tax price of the individual  is
assumed  to equal the marginal rate of substitution  between  public output and private income (the
reference  private good selected  as numeraire),  the tax burden thus obtained  would be a proxy for
benefits  from public output and would, therefore, represent the "true" evaluation  of public output by
private individuals.
These ideas may be shown diagrammatically  as in Figure 1.
Privwe  Incoml  FIGURE 1: EVALUATION  OF
PUBLIC SERVICES
A  c
0  G  B
Public Ices
-8  -The amount  of public output is measured  along the abscissa and private income is measured
along the ordinate.  Let OG be the amount of public output available  to society and OY the amount  of
private income of a certain individual. If II is an indifference  curve derived from a utility function  in
private income and public output, and YB is tangent to II at point C, then the slope of YB (the
tangent of e) expresses  the marginal  rate of substitution  between  private income and public output and
is also the ratio of marginal  utilities. The "value" of public output in terms of private ircome is
therefore equal to YA.
In algebraic terms, let V equal YA and represent an individual's  evaluation  of public output.
Then, according to the earlier analysis,
Vs  -a  /a-.  G= k f (  a+P) nG-pYpl  (16) au/ace 
Substituting  equation (4') into (16) we obtain
V=  k  +P)  1n Irk]  *G  (17) ac  1-k
Equation (17) is the equilibrium  evaluation  of supplied  public output by the private sector and
shows  that the citizens' perception  of public sector activity depends  both on the parameters at and 1
and on the individuals'  perceived  tax rate, n.
Equations  (4), (15) and (17) may be used to draw certain conclusions  regarding  the
relationships  among  the desired output by bureaucrats, GB,  the desired  public output by citizens, Gp,
and the evaluation  by citizens, V, of actually supplied  output. We will distinguish  certain specific
cases based on simplifying  assumptions.
D.  Some Specfic Cases
As background  to the analysis, we assume that the actually  supplied  public output is equal to
the bureaucrats' desired output, namely that G=GB.
We will also make the simplifying  assumption  that n= 1, i.e. that the private sector assumes  a
balanced  budget.  Under these circumstances,  we may derive the following  conditions  determining  the
relationships  between G 8 on the one hand, and Gp, V on the other:
Case 1. Desired vs. Actual Public Output:
From equation (4') it follows that for Gp 5  GB  it must be true that
,B  (1 -nk)  :r n (a +,B) (1 -k)  (8
For n= 1, this expression  becomes
-9-,B  (1-k)  s (a+p)  (1 -k)
or
Osa  (18
which is always satisfied. Therefore, the desired public output by the private sector, G., will
be less than the output provided  by bureaucrats, Go, so long as ac>  0 .
Case  2. Evaluation  of Actual Public Output:
From equation (17), it follows  that V!9GB  implies
k~  r (cc+)  n-P  1l nk]  s1  (19)
cc  1-k
For n= 1, this expression  becomes
kc1  (19')
which is always satisfied  since k is the marginal  propensity  to consume. Therefore, so long
as k< 1, the evaluation  of public output  by the private sector will be lower than the actually  measured
public s.rvices.
It is possible to derive simple explicit expressions  for GB,  G, and V under some further
simplifying  assumptions,  namely that e=O and a + (  = 1.  Then, equations  (15), (4') and (17) yield
GB=  (20)
GP=3  (21)
k  E  40_  (22) v==  k  (1_p)  =k  4 22
Equations  (20), (21) and (22) show in explicit  functional  form the conditions  obtained in
equations  (18') and (19').  Since B, kl  1, it follows  that Gp, V5GB.  The fundamental  conclusion
derived from these results is that, under certain  simplifying  hypotheses, but also with elementary
assumptions  about certain standard  parameters,  both the desired and the perceived  value of public
- 10  -services  by the private sector is lower than the amount  provided  by Government. This is an
interesting  conclusion  which should give fiscal decision-makers  cause for reflection.
IV.  SOME  INDIRECT  EVIDENCE  FROM  CENTRAL  EUROPE  COUNTRIES
Ihe  results of the previous section  are applied  to four Central Europe countries  --
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Poland and Slovenia--  to obtain an empirical  sense of the approach  outlined
in this paper. 7 It is clear that, given  the assumptions  of the model and the unobservability  of several
key parameters,  the evidence  presented here must be interpreted  more as a range indicator  than
strictly as a quantitative  point estimate.
The objective  of the exercise is to calculate  the value of the parameter z in equation  (4') in
order to determine  the relationship  between  desired public output Gp  and actual  public output G.
Table I shows the results of these calculations  for Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia  for the years 1989-1992.  Data are drawn from the Central Europe Department's  resident
Policy Matrix. Besides  the parameter z, the table shows the values of the critical parameters  that
determine  the value of z, namely: n, the perceived  tax rate by the private sector; t, the actual total
revenue  to GDP ratio; d, the deficit to GDP ratio; and g, the expenditure  to GDP ratio.  The
parameter  k is the average propensity  to consume  and the parameter P  is assumed  to equal 0.7.
TABLE  1:  "Desired"  vs.  Actual Public  Output
(in percent)
1989  1990  1991  192  Average
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
d=DEF/GDP  -2.4  0.1  -2.2  -3.0  -1.9
g=G/GDP  64.5  60.1  51.7  54.1  57.6
t=REV/GDP  62.1  60.0  49.5  51.1  55.7
k=APC  71.0  73.0  67.0  74.0  71.3
n= 1  +(d/g)  96.3  100.2  95.7  94.5'  96.7
z=Gp/G  79.3  69.6  79.4  85.8  78.5
HUNGARY
d=DEF/GDP  -1.3  0.4  -4.3  -2.1  -1.8
g=G/GDP  60.2  56.9  56.8  52.7  56.7
t=REV/GDP  58.9  56.5  52.5  50.6  54.9
k=APC  72.0  74.0  74.0  76.0  74.0
n= 1 + (d/g)  98.0  100.0  92.0  96.0  96.5
z=GpiG  75.5  68.1  92.1  82.1  79.4
7/  Albania  and Croatia were initially  included  in the exercise, but were eventually  dropped  due to lack of consistent
and reliable  data.
- 11  -TABLE 1 (continued):  "Desired"  vs. Actual Public Output
(in percent)
1989  1990  1991  1992  Average
POLAND
d=DEF/GDP  -5.3  2.5  -4.9  -6.6  -3.6
g=G/GDP  37.9  42.7  39.1  43.6  40.8
t=REV/GDP  32.6  45.2  34.2  37.0  37.2
k=APC  57.0  61.0  73.0  72.0  65.8
n=l+(d/g)  86.0  106.0  87.0  85.0  91.0
z=Gp/G  96.5  60.0  107.1  114.6  94.6
SLOVENTIA
d=DEF/GDP  0.3  -0.4  2.7  -1.0  0.4
g=G/GDP  41.7  48.9  40.5  43.5  43.7
t=REV/GDP  42.0  48.6  43.2  42.6  44.0
k=APC  67.6  74.2  73.8  69.9  71.4
n= 1  +(d/g)  100.7  99.2  106.7  97.7  101.2
z=GplG  68.5  72.2  53.3  75.5  67.4
Source: Author's  calculations.  Original  data from EC2  Departmental  Policy  Matrix.
As Table 1 indicates,  in all four countries  the presumptive  public output desired by the private
sector was on average lower than the actually  supplied  output, ranging from just over 67% for
Slovenia  to 95% for Poland, with Czechoslovakia  and Hungary in the middle with about 80%.
Within the time period under examination,  Czechoslovakia  and Hungary exhibited  the lowest
variance, followed  by Slovenia  and Poland. In Poland, the desired public sector activities  as a
percent of the actual public sector output ranged  from a low of 60% in 1990  to a high of 114.6% in
1992.
If these calculations  are interpreted  at face value, two important  conclusions  emerge: First, in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia  the private sectors are more homogeneous  and exhibit similar behavioral
patterns, which may be summarized  as being less dependent  on public sector services. In Poland, the
private sector belongs to a distinct category, and appears  to have been more "erratic" in its evaluation
of the public sector, although  on balance its demand for public sector activities is much closer to the
actual supply. In Slovenia,  private individuals  have consistently  under-evaluated  the importance  of
public services, on average more than 30% between 1989-1992.
What is a possible interpretation  of these trends? Since they represent a fundamental
macroeconomic  position  of private vs. public sector activities, these trends can also be interpreted  by
fundamental  macroeconomic  differences  in those countries. The basic differences are, first, that
Hungary and Czechoslovakia  had a more advanced  private sector than Poland at the beginning  of their
reform programs and, second, that the transformation  process in Hungary and Czechoslovakia  was
slower than that of Poland.  Both of these differences  suggest that the private sector in the latter
- 12 -countries  was in a better position  to adjust to changing circumstances  without  the help of the public
sector than it was the case for Poland. In Slovenia,  the share of government expenditures  in GDP is
not much different than that of Poland, but it has been accompanied  by a conservative  fiscal stance,
which required a consistently  high share of taxes in national  income.
How can one explain that in 1991 and 1992  the desired public output  by the private sector in
Poland was higher than the actually  supplied  output? From all observations  in all three countries,
these are the only years where there appears  to be excess demand for public sector activity. The
interpretation  is related to the value of "n", the presumptive  "tax price" of public output. That
notional tax rate was sufficiently  low in Poland in 1991  and 1992  to justify a higher demand  for
public expenditures  than the measured  public output. In other words, the Polish private sector
assumed a low enough tax contribution  to warrant an expansion  of public sector spending.
Alternatively,  the low level of public output evaluation  by the private sector in Slovenia  may be
related to the very high presumptive "tax price" that the private sector rationally assumed  it would
have to pay for the provision of public services.
This line of reasoning,  although  valid, suffers  from the static nature of the model and, in
particular, from the simultaneity  of the variables, which masks a true causal relationship  among them.
The value of the parameter  n is determined  implicitly  by the actual  tax rate.  In principle, n should be
interpreted  as a variable, which is linked with the actual tax rate (and probably  other variables, as
well) through a behavioral, adaptive  relationship. In the present static model, n is but another
interpretation  of the actual  tax rate, t, which is obviously  linked with both the deficit and the
expenditure  ratios.
With these considerations  in mind, the excess demand for public output  observed in Poland in
1991  and 1992 is the direct result of the low revenue rate ( 34.2% in 1991 and 37% in 1992) or,
alternative,  of the high deficit ratio (4.9% of GDP in 1991  and 6.6% of GDP in 1992). In other
words, the intuitive  reasoning  behind the results of the model suggests  that, if the Government
increases  its spending  through deficit financing, it makes sense for the private sector to demand an
even higher level of public expenditures. It is also interesting  to note that, if this interpretation  is
correct, taxpayers  also suffer from fiscal illusion  or, to put it differently,  the Ricardian  equivalence  is
probably  not in the minds of the Polish private citizens. 8
An analogous  interpretation  may be established  for the low value of desired public services in
1990  in Poland.  In that year, the revenue ratio was considerably  high (45% of GDP) and the
Government  ran a surplus (2.5% of GDP), which prompted  the private citizens  to assume a high "tax
price" for government  expenditures  and, by extension,  to demand  a lower level of budget
expenditures. The low demand  for public output in Slovenia  throughout  the period may be explained
with a similar reasoning.  That country  consistently  shows a high tax ratio (the lowest was 42% in
1989  and the highest 48.6% in 1990),  which resulted in very low deficits and even surpluses  between
1989-1992. Under these circumstances,  i.e. when a given level of public services is provided not
through deficit financing  but in the form of higher taxes, it makes sense for citizens  to demand less
public output than the amount supplied  by  Government.
/  bThis  interpretation  would contradict  some U.S. evidence  that the public spending  share of GDP may be related  to
the existence  and size of budget deficits.  However, the U.S. evidence  is regarded  as "hardly  conclusive".  See C.L.
Schultz [1992].
- 13 -With the caveats noted earlier,  the results of this exercise point to a desirable general
reduction of public sector spending in all three countries along the lines of Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2:  Actual and Target Public Expenditures
(in percent)
Average 1989-92  Desired Reduction  Medium-term  Target
l_______________  (% of GDP)  (% of actual)  (% of GDP)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  57.6  20.0  46.1
HUNGARY  56.7  21.7  44.4
POLAND  40.8  5.0  38.8
SLOVENIA  43.7  32.6  29.4
Source:  Table 1
Table 3: Public Expenditure in Selected Countries
(in percent of GDP)
Average
1989  1988  1989  1987-89  Target
AUSTRIA  53.5  52.4  50.5  NA
FINLAND  43.9  41.6  41.1  4:  NA
FRANCE  48.6  48.6  47.7  NA
GERMANY  48.2  47.7  46.4  :  4  NA
IRELAND  55.4  51.7  44.6  NA
UNITED KINGDOM  41.1  39.5  40.3  NA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  58.2  60.5  64.5  61.1  41
HUNGARY  64.2  63.7  60.2  62.7  4
POLAND  48.1  48.2  37.9  44.7  _
SLOVENIA  ...  ...  ...  ...
Sources:  IMF; Government  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook. 1991; Central Europe  Departmental  Policy
Matrix; and Table 2.
- 14 -According  to the results of Table 2, which are based on the average deficit to GDP, and the
tax ratios over the period 1989-1992,  the target public sector expenditures  in the three Central Europe
countries are:  for Czechoslovakia  46% of GDP; for Hungary  44.4% of GDP; for Poland 38.8% of
GDP; and for Slovenia  29.4% of GDP.  Furthermore, as Table 3 indicates,  these ratios are closer to
the 1987-89  average for a group of European comparator  countries  (Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland and the United  Kingdom). These medium-term  targets imply a desired reduction of
public expenditures  in the order of 20% for Czechoslovakia  and Hungary, under 10% for Poland, and
30% for Slovenia. More importantly,  if the target expenditure  ratios derived in these calculations  for
the four countries  are interpreted  as the presumptive  demand  of public sector services  by the private
sector, they can be justified more easily as medium-term  objectives  of the respective  Governments.
V.  SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has combined elements  from the theory of public choice and the theory of benefit
taxation  to develop a homogeneous  conceptual  framework  for the evaluation  of public activities  by
private individuals. In the context of the benefit principle  of taxation, public activities  must be
provided  up to the point where the marginal  rate of substitution  between  publicly provided and
privately  purchased  goods equals the "tax price" of public goods. The "tax price" is the share of an
individual  in the total tax burden necessary  for the provision  of public expenditures. Within this
framework  it was also shown why, and under what conditions,  the presence of "bureaucrats",  i.e. of
a different societal group that derives both tangible and intangible  benefits  from the existence  of a
public sector per se, may influence  the provision of public output and thus the size of the public
sector. The interface  between private citizens  and bureaucrats  under the conceptual  framework  of this
paper gives rise to three different concepts  of public output: first, the observed, actually supplied
output  by Government.  Second, the desired output  by the private sector. And third, the "true"
evaluation  of the actually supplied  output b  the private sector. This paper has shown that these three
possible amounts  are not necessarily  equal.
The theoretical  results were subsequently  applied to four Central Europe countries:
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. By using historical  data for the period 1989-1991  and
currently available  projections  for 1992, the paper derived the "desired"  amount of public
expenditures  in each of these countries  and compared it to the actual  government  spending over the
same period. By interpreting  the indirect  evidence  available  for these countries under the framework
of the paper, it was shown that in all countries  the private sector would prefer a lower level of
government  activity - from a minimum  of 5% for Poland to a maximum  of nearly one-third for
Slovenia. If respective  Governments  were to move along these lines, their future expenditure  to GDP
ratios would be much closer to the 1987-89  average for a group of selected  european  market
economies.
This paper has attempted  to introduce  a somewhat  more rigorous, if not necessarily
"objective",  approach to the determination  of "optimal"  government  spending. This methodology  has
also aimed at drawing the line between economic  policy and the less rigorous arguments, occasionally
tainted  by political considerations,  about the role and size of the public sector. One advantage  of the
approach  presented in this paper is its limited informational  requirements.  A disadvantage  is the static
nature of the model and the required faith in the direction  of causality  among  some key variables. To
the extent that someone  is prepared to accept  the limitations  of the model, however, this approach
may prove a useful operational  guideline  for future work in the area of public expenditures.
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